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DNA Fingerprinting:
The Failings of Frye
JOHN MCCABE'

INTRODUCTION

The controversy surrounding the admissibility of deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) evidence in criminal trials provides a fascinating glimpse at the
growth and refinement of a new forensic science. Although much has been
criticized of the methodologies employed by the various laboratories utilized
by prosecutors,' there have been no real disputes concerning the theory
underlying the evidence. 2 To date, twenty-eight state supreme courts have
upheld the admissibility of some form of the evidence,3 and only a handful
have excluded it. Thus, it appears that the tide has clearly changed in the
direction of its admissibility.
This is not to say that all the issues relative to DNA admissibility have
been resolved. Currently a line of precedent exists which supports the
exclusion of the evidence based upon the way in which the raw data of the
* B.S., Northern Illinois University; J.D., Ohio State University; Assistant State's
Attorney, Will County, Illinois.
1. E.g., Eric S. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial, 339 NATURE 501 (1989).
2. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE
(National Academy Press 1992) [hereinafter NRC REPORT].
3. See Perry v. State, 586 So. 2d 242 (Ala. 1991); Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429
(Ark. 1991); Fishback v. State, 851 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1993); Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841
(Fla. 1988); Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1990); State v. Maltalbo, 828 P.2d 1274
(Haw. 1992); Davidson v. State, 580 N.E.2d 238 (Ind. 1991); State v. Brown, 470 N.W.2d
30 (Iowa 1991); State v. Smith, 807 P.2d 144 (Kan. 1991); Harris v. Commonwealth, 846
S.W.2d 678 (Ky. 1992); State v. Charles, 617 So. 2d 895 (La. 1993); Cobey v. State, 559
A.2d 391 (Md. 1989); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (Mass. 1994); State v.
Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1994); Polk v. State, 612 So. 2d 381 (Miss. 1992); State
v. Davis, 814 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1991); State v. Vandebogart, 652 A.2d 671 (N.H. 1994);
State v. Duran, 881 P.2d 48 (N.M. 1994); State V. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1994);
State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. 1990); State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107 (Ohio
1992); State v. Herzog, 864 P.2d 1362 (Or. 1993); Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395
(Pa. 1994); State v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781 (S.C. 1990); State v. Wimberley 467 N.W.2d 499
(S.D. 1991); Bethune v. State 828 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1992); State v. Passino, 640 A.2d 547
(Vt. 1994); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1989); State v. Woodall, 385
S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989); Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1993).
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procedure is statistically interpreted. 4 These courts have relied upon the
analysis outlined in Frye v. United States5 to uphold the exclusions, finding
that the statistical interpretations proffered by the state have not been
generally accepted within the scientific community. A Frye analysis
requires a finding by a court that a new scientific theory or procedure is
generally accepted within the scientific community prior to its admissibility
in court.6 A close examination of these cases reveals the inadequacies of
the Frye analysis when applied to a highly sophisticated developing forensic
science.
These cases primarily highlight the criticism of the Frye standard as
being subject to manipulation by those seeking to exclude evidence.7 In
these cases the defense counsel has successfully argued to the court that in
addition to the theory and procedures utilized to generate the raw data, the
interpretation of that data must also meet the Frye criteria. This fragmentation of the Frye analysis allows the defense more than one opportunity at
having the evidence excluded.
Why should the Frye analysis extend farther than considering the
The answer
theory which generally underlies the forensic process?
ultimately lies in the distrust courts have for the ability of jurors to
adequately consider and weigh potential errors in the forensic process. The
fear is that the jury will be so overwhelmed by the nature of the scientific
testimony that they will not critically examine whether appropriate
procedures were followed to obtain the final results.8
Further, these cases reveal the inadequacies of applying the Frye
standard to an emerging sophisticated forensic process. The Frye analysis,
so it is argued, allows the court to rule on the admissibility of extremely
complex scientific evidence without having to choose a side in a scientific
debate.9 By focusing on general acceptance, a court does not have to
become involved in weighing the complex issues involved in an emerging
4. See United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1992); State v. Bible, 858
P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502 (Wash. 1993); State v. Watson, 629
N.E.2d 634 (III. App. Ct. 1994); People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992).
5. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

6. Id. at 1014.

7. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §203 (Edward W. Cleary
ed., 3d ed. 1984).
8. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that
"scientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility .... ).
9. Id. at 743 (contending that "[tihe requirement of general acceptance in the
scientific community assures that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a
scientific method will have the determinative voice").
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forensic science. An examination of the decisions where the courts have
excluded DNA evidence, however, shows that notwithstanding assertions to
the contrary, the courts have taken the side of those seeking to exclude the
evidence.
If, in the end, a court must become involved in the weighing of the
issues surrounding the presentation of a new forensic science, then that
court's determination of what constitutes general acceptance will be
determined by the court's resolution of the substantive issues in the relevant
scientific dispute.
Because new forensic techniques are developed in adversarial
environments, there will exist no lack of criticism of a given advance. That
criticism will extend to whether or not the advance is generally accepted
within the relevant scientific community. A court is then put in the position
of choosing sides as to which expert is to be believed on the issue of
general acceptance. That decision will ultimately involve the court in
assessing the merits of the scientific dispute--the very endeavor that the Frye
analysis was intended to avoid.
When a court becomes involved in weighing the scientific issues
underlying the debate over what is generally accepted, it has the unintended
result of promoting division within the scientific community. In trying to
persuade the court, each side will partly discredit the other side. As a result,
achieving a consensus is made all the more difficult.
This leads to the conclusion that the traditional Frye analysis is simply
an inadequate framework in which a new developing forensic science can
be evaluated and should be abandoned in favor of the federal rule of
evidence which focuses on the reliability of the evidence."

I. DNA: A BRIEF SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
The forensic science of DNA analysis is an outgrowth of the medical
diagnostic analysis of DNA. Such research has determined much about the
structure of DNA over which there is no scientific dispute. DNA is the
active substance of our genes and is found in every cell in our bodies which
has a nucleus." The DNA molecule is made up of four chemical bases

10. FED. R. EvID. 702. Rule 702 states that "if scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
11. See generally People v. Axell, I Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining
the nature of DNA and DNA fingerprinting).
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strung together in pairs in extremely long sequences. 2 The entire human
genome is approximately three billion base pairs long.' 3
An extremely important tool for genetic research resulted from the
discovery that certain enzymes called restriction endonucleases would cut
the DNA molecule at specific locations. The resulting fragments could then
be extensively analyzed. In 1975 Edwin Southern developed a procedure
by which specific DNA fragments could be separated and then visualized on
X-ray film. 4 The resulting images are known as autorads.
When it was discovered that some of these fragments were polymorphisms, it was realized that they could be used to map the human genome. 15
These fragments became known as restriction fragment length polymorphisms (RFLPs), and they have been used to map a number of disease causing
genes.1 6 RFLPs have also been extensively used in molecular biology,
7
biochemistry, genetics, and clinical DNA diagnosis.
RFLPs became of considerable interest to forensic scientists when some
of them were discovered to have a high degree of variability between
individuals.' 8 These fragments have the same sequence of bases in
individuals, but vary greatly in terms of how many times the sequences
repeat themselves. They are known as variable number tandem repeats
(VNTRs). A particular sequence can repeat itself thousands of times.' 9
The number of times a sequence repeats itself will determine the physical
length of the fragment. The most widely used forensic application of DNA
analysis focuses on these sequences and is generally referred to as RFLP
analysis.
While there is no dispute that the RFLP procedure is generally accepted
within the scientific community, there has been much criticism of its
application to forensic science. In the clinical use of the RFLP procedure
samples are generally pristine, in sufficient quantities to allow repetition,

12. Id.

13. Id.
14. See Edwin M. Southern, Detection ofSpecific Sequences Among DNA Fragments
Separated by Gel Electrophoresis, 98 J. MOLECULAR BIOL. 503 (1975).
15. David Botstein et al., Construction of a Genetic Linkage Map- in Man Using
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms, 32 AM. J. HuM. GENETICS 314, 314 (1980).
16. See, e.g., James F. Gusella et al., A Polymorphic DNA Marker Genetically Linked
to Huntington's Disease, 306 NATURE 234, 234 (1983).
17. See C. Thomas Caskey, Disease Diagnosis by Recombinant DNA Methods, 236
Sci. 1223 (1987).
18. Arlene Wyman & Ray White, A Highly Polymorphic Locus in Human DNA, 77
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6754 (1980).
19. See Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable 'Minisatellite' Regions in Human DNA,
314 NATURE 67 (1985).

19961

DNA FINGERPRINTING: THE FAILINGS OF FRYE

and the inquiry focuses on a limited number of discrete alleles. The forensic
application, on the other hand, involves degraded or contaminated samples
of limited quantity, and, because the focus is on highly polymorphic areas
2°
of the genome, there is a need for a statistical interpretation of the result.
Once DNA is extracted from a sample restriction, enzymes are used to
cut the DNA at specific locations. The resulting fragments are then placed
in one end of a gel and an electrical current is run through the gel, causing
the fragments to migrate to the other side. The gel itself acts as a sieve so
that the smaller fragments travel faster than the larger fragments. After a
given period of time the current is stopped and the fragments are then
denatured (i.e., the chemical bonds between the complimentary strands of
the DNA molecule are broken, resulting in single stranded DNA molecules)
and affixed to a nylon membrane. This allows the fragments of interest to
be hybridized with synthesized fragments of DNA which have been
radioactively tagged. Only the fragments of interest will then appear on the
autorad. And since everyone's DNA comes in pairs--DNA contributed by
each parent--there will normally be two bands on the autorad for each
fragment of interest.
The size of the fragment are determined through reference to size
ladders which appear in intervals along the length of the autorad. The size
ladders are fragments of DNA, the exact size having been determined
through other methods. They have also been tagged with radioactive
substances so their images appear on the autorad.
So, for forensic purposes, when a questioned VNTR appears on an
autorad, its size is estimated by reference to the known fragments of the size
ladders. The interval between the fragments of the size ladders represent a
range of sizes. Therefore, the most that can be determined in the forensic
sizing process is that the questioned fragment size falls within a given range.
But because there is a high degree of variability among individual VNTR
sizes, knowing what range of sizes a VNTR falls into can be extremely
informative if we know how often in the human population individuals have
a VNTR falling within a range of sizes delineated by the size ladder.
The methodology described above was pioneered by the FBI and is
known as "fixed-bin" analysis. 2 1 Bin refers to the area between the size
markers, and the bin is fixed because the same size ladder is used on all the
autorads used in this methodology, i.e., the autorads used to declare a match
between the questioned and known samples as well as the autorads used to
20. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
21. See Bruce Budowle ef al., Fixed-Bin Analysis for Statistical Evaluation of
Continuous Distributionsof Allelic Datafrom VNTR Loci, for Use in Forensic Comparisons,
48 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 841 (1991).
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construct a database. For each bin the FBI compiled a data base to establish
how frequently in the population bands appear in a given bin. More
precisely, how frequently a particular range of VNTR sizes occurs in the
population. By examining a number of VNTR loci, a frequency estimation
can be made as to how rare that particular genotype occurs in the population.
The supporters of the fixed-bin method claim that this is a conservative
method of calculating the frequency of a VNTR size. It is conservative
because the bin represents a range of sizes, and therefore its frequency as an
entity is much greater than the frequency of a specific size fragment. Thus,
in computing the frequency of a forensic sample, the questioned VNTR will,
by reference to the corresponding bin, be given the frequency of that bin as
a whole. Using this method, therefore, the assigned frequency of a
questioned VNTR will be greater than its true frequency. Additionally,
other measures are taken to avoid the underestimation of an accused's
genetic profile.22
Although virtually every aspect of the FBI's methodology has been
subjected to relentless scrutiny and criticism, the focus of the current attacks
have been upon the statistical interpretation of the results of the process.
For example, the court in People v. Watson2 a noted that "we are satisfied
that the procedures utilized by the FBI are capable of giving reliable results,
and we leave to a jury the determination of whether such results were
attained in the present case. ,24 But the court went on to say, "[t]his brings
us to the heart of this appeal, namely, whether the final step of DNA
analysis--the determination of a match's statistical significance--has gained
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. '"25
It was the state's contention that this inquiry was wholly unnecessary.
The court observed that "[t]he State initially contends that the trial court
erred in treating the FBI's statistical calculation as a novel scientific
principle subject to the Frye test. ,26 The court, without any kind of
explanation, dismissed this contention.

22.
observed
frequency
23.
24.

Id. The FBI rebins its data bases so that no one bin contains less than five
alleles and also computes the frequency of homozygotes as being twice the
of the single allele as opposed to the square of the allele.
629 N.E.2d 634 (I1. App. Ct. 1994).
Id. at 644.

25. Id.
26. Id.
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II. APPLYING FRYE

Why should the statistical analysis be subject to the Frye test? There
is absolutely nothing novel about the statistical principles utilized by the
FBI. Surely criticism abounds in the assumptions made in the utilization of
those principles, but that does not go to the weight of this kind of evidence.
A very influential case which imposed the Frye analysis upon the statistical
interpretation of the data generated through RFLP analysis is People v.
Barney.27 The Barney court addressed the contention by the state that the
28
statistical analysis by the FBI should not be subjected to a Frye analysis.
The court asked whether "the statistical calculation step [could] be distinguished from the processing and matching steps for Kelly-Frye purposes on
the ground that only the first two steps produce novel scientific evidence
while the third step is merely interpretive?"2 9 Which, of course, was
exactly the state's position both in Barney as well as in Watson. According
to the Barney court, however, the answer to this question is no because:
Again, such an approach would subvert Kelly-Frye. The evidence
produced by DNA analysis is not merely the raw data of the
matching bands on autoradiographs but encompasses the ultimate
expression of the statistical significance of a match, in the same
way that polygraph evidence is not merely the raw data produced
by a polygraph machine but encompasses the operator's ultimate
expression of opinion whether the subject is telling the truth.
Were we to terminate the Kelly-Frye inquiry short of the interpretive steps in new methods of scientific proof, Kelly-Frye would
lose much of its efficacy as a tool of "considerable judicial
caution" and of an "essentially conservative nature" that is
"deliberatively intended to interpose a substantial obstacle to the
unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scientific
principles."3
The court's analogy to polygraph evidence is extremely weak. First,
the clear majority of jurisdictions which have considered the issue of the
admissibility of DNA evidence have found it to be admissible, while on the
other hand, there has been virtually a universal rejection of polygraph
evidence." Though there is no dispute that DNA analysis has the potential

27.
28.
29.
30.
3 1.

10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 740.
Id. at 742.
Id. (citation omitted).
See N.J. Marini, Annotation, Physiological or Psychological Truth and Deception
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to unequivocally identify an individual, no such claims can be made for the
polygraph's potential to unequivocally determine whether a subject is telling
the truth. The most that is typically asserted is that the polygraph serves as
"reliable diagnosis of truth or deception."32
Secondly, the raw data of a polygraph is different in kind than what is
produced through DNA analysis. The polygraph measures and records
blood pressure changes, respiration changes, pulse changes, and changes in
the skin resistance to electricity.33 This data has to be interpreted by the
examiner, as the Barney court points out, in order for the examiner to be
able to give an opinion as to whether a subject was telling the truth.34 But
this "raw data" can be affected by a variety of factors, over which the
examiner has no control, which have nothing whatsoever to do with whether
a subject is telling the truth.35 With DNA analysis, however, if the
technician performs the procedure properly, the result is completely
objective information as to the size of a VNTR. In other words, there is
virtually no dispute over whether the "raw data" informs us as to the actual
size of a questioned VNTR.
So disregarding this inappropriate analogy, we are left
with the court's
assertion, quoting the language of People v. Kelly,36 that to end the KellyFrye inquiry short of the interpretive steps, i.e., the statistical analysis,
would result in its losing its efficacy as a tool of "considerable judicial
caution" and its "essentially conservative nature" that is "deliberatively
intended to interpose a substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of
37
evidence based upon new scientific principles.
These policy considerations of what the court believes the Frye inquiry
entails is really the only basis for extending thie inquiry to the examination
of the statistical interpretation of scientific data. There certainly exists no
legal precedent to so bifurcate the inquiry. Additionally, what precedent
which exists concerning the admissibility of statistical evidence in non-DNA
cases is utterly devoid of any like analysis.
From time to time prosecutors have introduced evidence in the form of
the expression of a probability that a specific event has occurred. In the

Tests, 23 A.L.R. 2d 1306 (1952).

32. ANDRE MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 14.02 (3d

ed. 1986).
33.
34.
35.
725, 730
36.
37.

Id. at § 14.03.
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737.
David Lykken, Psychology and the Lie Detection Industry, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
(1974).
549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742.
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particularly egregious case of People v. Collins,38 the prosecutor, for the
purpose of bolstering a very tentative identification of the defendant, called
a mathematician to testify as to the probability of several general characteristics which both the defendant and the perpetrator shared: race, facial hair,
a female accomplice of a different race, and an automobile of a particular
color. 39 The prosecutor assigned a probability for each separate event and
then multiplied the probabilities together for the conclusion that there was
only a one in 12,000,000 chance that someone other than the defendant
committed the crime.40 No foundation existed for any of the probabilities
put forward by the prosecutor, who apparently fabricated them. Needless
to say, the case was reversed.
A more accepted use of statistical evidence can be found in those
cases where serological evidence of traditional blood typing systems has
been presented. These typing systems are able to detect the presence of
different enzymes, which vary from individual to individual. Population
studies are used to base an opinion of the frequency a given enzyme occurs
in the population. Then, through the use of the product rule,4" the
frequency obtained in each system is multiplied together to obtain a frequency which expresses how common or rare the combination of different
protein variants occur in the population.42
These protein variants are genetic markers much in the way VNTRs
are; the difference between the two is that the former are only modestly
polymorphic while the latter are highly polymorphic. As a result, in the use
of the more traditional blood typing systems, the final probability which
expresses how common or rare the genotype is typically on the order of one
out of hundreds. With DNA analysis, of course, the final expressed

38.
39.
40.
41.
643, 657

Id.

438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968).
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 37.
A demonstration of the product rule is found in People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d
n.23 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1988):
If one had to choose an automobile numbered but not seen and there were
5 hardtops and 5 convertibles, the probability of selecting a convertible
would be I out of 2. If 5 of the automobiles are blue, the probability of
selecting a blue automobile is I out of 2, and the probability of selecting
a blue convertible is I out of 4. If only convertibles are colored blue, the
probability of selecting a blue convertible reverts back to I out of 2.

42. Benjamin Grunbaum et al., Distribution of Gene Frequencies and Discrimination
Probabilities for 22 Human Blood Genetic Systems in Four Racial Groups, 25 J. FORENSIC
Sci. 428 (1980).
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probability is usually on the order of one out of millions.43
Both techniques look at specific genetic markers and assign a frequency
as to how common they occur in the population based upon studies of the
relevant population. Both techniques then use the product rule to multiply
the frequencies of each separate genetic marker. A final frequency which
purports to represent how rare the combination of genetic markers occur in
the population is then obtained.
Yet in the cases which have considered the admissibility of the
traditional genetic marker evidence, the issue of the statistical interpretation
of the results has never been subjected to a Frye inquiry. This has been
true, even though the same concerns of population substructure and the
appropriateness of the relevant data base have been raised by the defense.
Time and again courts have resolved the issue by concluding that the
objections to what specific probability is testified to is an issue concerning
what amount of weight to assign to the evidence and not an issue of
admissibility." The touchstone has been whether or not the statistics at
issue are based on established facts as opposed to mere speculation.
After all, if there are egregious problems with a particular data base, a
defense attorney can bring that out either during cross examination or
through the presentation of expert witnesses in the field of population
genetics. The concern over population substructure could be presented in
the same fashion. By doing so, the counsel for the defense would be able
to attack and possibly completely discredit the statistics presented by the
state. The finder of fact would then have a basis for disregarding the
statistical evidence altogether.
It appears, however, a distinction has been made between the use of
statistics which are merely probative and those that appear to be conclusive.
The basis for that distinction is not founded upon logic; rather, it is based
upon a fundamental distrust of the abilities of the average jury.
This is illustrated clearly in a series of cases out of the state of
Massachusetts. The first case is Commonwealth v. Gomes45 where the
Massachusetts Supreme Court considered the admissibility of evidence of
genetic markers in the form of enzymes found in a subject's blood as

43. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
44. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 418 N.W.2d 618 (S.D. 1988); Dumond v. State, 721
S.W.2d 663 (Ark. 1986); State v. Washington, 662 P.2d 986 (Kan. 1981); State v. Klindt,
389 N.W.2d 670 (Iowa 1978); People v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824 (Me. 1978); Plunkett v. State,
719 P.2d 834 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986); and State v. Redman, 481 N.E.2d 1272 (I11.App. Ct.
1985).
45. 526 N.E.2d 1270 (Mass. 1988).
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revealed through electrophoresis.46 The trial court had conducted a Frye
hearing concerning its admissibility and allowed the evidence to be
presented at trial.47 On review, the supreme court also concluded that the
electrophoresis process is generally accepted within the scientific community. 48 The court then considered the defendant's claim that the use of
statistics by the state to express how rare the defendant's combination of
enzymes were was error because its probative value was outweighed by its
potential to confuse or prejudice the jury.49
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in response to this latter claim,
initially noted that the "relevance of such evidence is unassailable,"50 and
bolstered its conclusion by citing a number of other jurisdictions where such
evidence had been held to be admissible. 5' And while they noted the
disfavor for the admissibility of statistical evidence, the court concluded that
"where the statistical evidence is shown to be based on accepted scientific
principles, courts, including this one, have admitted such evidence." 52 As
to the scientific basis for the statistical evidence in the Gomes case, the court
observed:
The statistical figure was presented as indicating that the defendant belonged to a population group exhibiting a certain genetic
array; there was no attempt to use the figure as "odds" that the
defendant was guilty. The calculations on which the probability
determinations were based were explained in detail. On this basis,
the judge could find, as a preliminary finding of fact, that the
statistical evidence presented was based on established, empirical
data rather than speculation and that the evidence was more
probative than prejudicial. Therefore, the evidence was properly
admitted. 3
In a footnote to the above passage, the court makes reference to the
testimony of a defense witness who raised the issue of population substructure as well as disputing the legitimacy of the product rule--the same
arguments raised in DNA cases. The court dismissed these concerns with
the assertion that "[hlowever, once the witness had been qualified as an
expert and it has been shown that the statistics are based on established facts

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1275.
Id.
Id. at 1275-77.
Id. at 1277-79.
id. at 1279.
Id. at 1279-80.
Id. at 1280.
Id. (citations omitted).
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rather than estimates or speculation, such criticisms4 go only to the weight
to be accorded the evidence, not its admissibility.0
The above reasoning, however, was thrown out the window in the
subsequent case of Commonwealth v. Cumin." Cumin involved the rape
of a handicapped fourteen-year-old girl.56 Semen found on her nightgown
was subjected to DNA analysis by Cellmark" The result of that analysis
was that the defendant's DNA matched that found on the nightgown, and,
according to Cellmark, only one Caucasian in 59,000,000 would have the
same genetic profile.5"
The defendant appealed, alleging many claims of error concerning the
admission of the DNA evidence, but the Massachusetts supreme court
focused on the statistical analysis of the data. 59 They stated:
We need not resolve the propriety of the forensic DNA testing
conducted in this case because we conclude that there is no
demonstrated general acceptance or inherent rationality of the
process by which Cellmark arrived at its conclusion that one
Caucasian in 59,000,000 would have the DNA components
disclosed by the test that showed an identity between the defendant's DNA and that found on the nightgown. 6°
Here the court also states that, in addition to the lack of general
acceptance in the scientific community for the statistical calculations, there
was a lack of foundation for the testimony. 6' The court noted that the
state's only expert witness was not qualified to give an opinion as to the
statistical methodology employed by Cellmark.6 2 The implication is that
a sufficient foundation--expert testimony which could support the statistical
methodology employed--could support the admissibility of the evidence.
But notwithstanding the court's finding of a lack of foundation for the
testimony, it is relatively clear that the defense counsel's argument that the
statistical evidence was not generally accepted within the scientific community greatly influenced the court. After analyzing the evidence in the case,
the court asserted that "[t]here is no showing, however, that scientists agree
generally that the distribution of the alleles disclosed in Cellmark's testing

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1280-81 n.I0.
565 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. 1991).
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 441-42.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 442-43.
Id. at 443.
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is random in the Caucasian population so as to warrant the calculations
' 63
made by Cellmark. ,
This line of reasoning is a significant departure from the Gomes
decision. In Gomes all that was needed was that the statistical evidence be
based upon empirical facts and not speculation. Now, surprisingly, the
statistical analysis itself must be subjected to the Frye criteria.
The Cumin court cites the Gomes case and distinguishes it by stating
"genetic marker analysis of blood stains for blood characteristics has been
accepted because the nature of the distribution of those characteristics
among the population is well-accepted by the scientific community."' But
the foregoing proposition was not established in the Gomes case. 65 The
same concerns raised by the defense expert, Dr. Mueller, which so greatly
impressed the Cumin court, were essentially raised by the defense expert,
Dr. Juricek, in the Gomes case. Footnote ten in the Gomes case' establishes that the court believed that the exact distribution of genetic characteristics in the population is a dispute over the extent and amount of weight the
67
evidence should be given and not one of admissibility.
In imposing the Frye standard upon the statistical evidence, the Cumin
court did not cite any evidence which establishes that new or novel
statistical methodologies were employed; rather, they placed great weight
upon the testimony of the defense expert, Dr. Mueller, and the scientific
articles submitted. Dr. Mueller criticized at length the data base used by
Cellmark. 6' He criticized the adequacy of the data base in reference to
some missing data, but most of his criticism centered around the possibility
of substructures existing in the human population. 69 According to Mueller,
if such substructuring existed, then the VNTR frequencies used by Cellmark
would not be justified.7 ' He suggested that data from a geographically
representative population should be used in the data base.7'
By way of a supplemental appendix, the defense counsel also submitted
the testimonies of Dr. Daniel Hartl and Professor Richard Lewontin, who
testified in the case of United States v. Yee. 72 Both had testified in Yee as
to the existence of subgroups within the population which would not be
63. Id. at 444.

64. Id.

65. 526 N.E.2d at 1280-81 n.10.
66. Id.

67. Id.

68. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d at 444.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.

72. 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
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accounted for in the data bases relied upon by the state. The court
specifically cited the testimony of Professor Lewontin:
He concluded that "on population genetics grounds alone, a valid
and reliable estimate of probabilities of random matches with a
given VNTR profile cannot currently be arrived at." He thought
that proper data gathering of ethnic subgroups within Caucasians
would provide tables of probabilities from which, on a case by
case basis, the appropriate reference group for a comparison could
be selected."
Again, the concern is the existence of subgroups in the population, and
again, the solution is to gather sufficient data which accounts for these
subgroups.
The scientific dispute the court relies upon in imposing the Frye
analysis is empirical in nature. It has nothing to do with imposing new or
novel methodologies, but rather whether the state is justified in applying
those methodologies to the specific empirical data it relied upon. It is
founded upon the testimony of defense experts who attack the data base
used by the state. The cited testimony of Professor Lewontin is sufficient
that the use of the theories employed by the state would be proper if the
appropriate data was gathered. So what can be the justification for imposing
the Frye analysis upon a scientific dispute as to whether mistakes have been
made in the collection of data?
Clearly the motivation for imposing the Frye analysis to this type of
evidence resides in the court's distrust of the abilities of the common juror.
In discussing future attempts to admit DNA evidence, the court stated:
Future challenges should focus on the soundness and general
acceptance of the particular testing process for forensic use, and,
if raised, on the proper implementation of that process in the
given case. Until such questions are resolved by a judge, a jury
should not be given the evidence and allowed to determine the
validity and soundness of the process because evidence of this
character has too great a potential for affecting a jury's judgment.74
This expression of the lack of confidence in juries is absent in the
Gomes case. In Gomes, the court determined that the jury was competent
to decide what weight to give statistical evidence." However, the Cumin
court decided it must keep such evidence from the jury because it has "too

73. Curnin, 565 N.E.2d at 445 n.12 (emphasis in original).
74. Id. at 442-43 n.7.
75. Gomes, 526 N.E.2d at 1280.
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great a potential for affecting a jury's judgment. '7 6 This is the most
striking difference between the two cases.
But the Massachusetts Supreme Court seemed to have a different focus
when it finally upheld the admission of a statistical interpretation of DNA
evidence in the case of Commonwealth v. Lanigan." The Lanigan court
noted that strict adherence to Frye may keep reliable evidence from the fact
finder. The court then articulated that the test for admissibility was not
simply general acceptance, but rather demonstrated reliability,78 which is
basically the criteria of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 79 The
concern here is the possibility that reliable evidence might be kept from the
jury, as opposed to a fear that such evidence may unduly affect the jury's
judgment.
If we return to the influential Barney decision, the court is quite
explicit in its distrust of the abilities of the average jury. When the court
addressed the "threshold issue" of whether the Kelly-Frye criteria should be
applied to the statistical interpretation of the DNA evidence, the court stated:
We cannot reasonably ask the average juror to decide such arcane
questions as whether genetic substructuring and linkage disequilibrium preclude use of the Hardy-Weinberg equation and the
product rule, when we ourselves have struggled to grasp these
concepts. The result would be predictable. The jury would skip
to the bottom line--the only aspect of the process that is readily
understood--and look at the ultimate expression of match probability, without competently assessing the reliability of the process by
which the laboratory got to the bottom line.80
The presumption by the court is that a jury will not have the capacity to
give due consideration to the attacks upon the state's evidence by way of
cross examination and through the presentation of defense experts. It is
interesting to note the arrogance in this attitude: because the California First
District Court of Appeal had difficulty comprehending the concepts, a
fortiori the common juror could not understand them. Another implication
is that the attorneys for the defense cannot adequately attack the state's
experts nor effectively present their own experts who give contrary opinions.
Distrust in the abilities of jurors marks the line between those
jurisdictions that admit more complex evidence and those jurisdictions that
exclude it. In addressing the admissibility of DNA evidence, a few courts
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Cumin, 565 N.E.2d at 443 n.7.
641 N.E.2d 1342 (Mass. 1994).
Id. at 1347.
FED. R. EvID. 702, see supra note 10 and accompanying text for further details.
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

have explicitly expressed confidence in the abilities of jurors. In discussing
the Minnesota cases which disallowed statistical evidence because it was
determined to invade the province of the jury, the court in Martinez v.
State"' noted:
The Minnesota cases do not consider the adequacy of the
statistical evidence's foundation. Rather, they are concerned with
the potentially exaggerated impact on the jury of such absoluteness. The Minnesota Supreme Court remains unconvinced that
rebuttal by way of diligent cross examination will dispel the
psychological impact of the suggestion of mathematical precision.
We agree with Justice Kelley, who dissented in Kim. He
criticized the majority opinion for its reliance on conclusions
expressed in Professor Tribe's Harvard Law Review article,
because they have been successfully challenged and rebutted by
other researchers. Furthermore, Justice Kelley agreed with the
large majority of other courts who have a "higher opinion of the
jury's ability to weigh the credibility
of such figures when
82
properly presented and challenged.'
And the court in United States v. Jakobetz8 3 observed that "[a]lthough
scientific and statistical evidence may seem complicated, we do not think
that a jury will be so dazzled or swayed as to ignore evidence suggesting
that an experiment was improperly conducted or that testing procedures have
not been established., 8 4 Both the Martinez and Jakobetz courts upheld the
admissibility of DNA evidence.
Not coincidentally, courts which have expressed concern about the
abilities of jurors have ultimately excluded DNA evidence under the Frye
criteria. The relevant question appears to be whether courts should have
confidence in the abilities of jurors. There is obviously a difference of
opinion with respect to the correct answer to this question, but a compelling
reason to answer in the affirmative, at least in reference to the admission of
DNA evidence, is the acknowledgement by Eric Lander, one of the most
renown critics of the methodologies employed by the FBI, and one who is
often cited by defense attorneys seeking to exclude such evidence. He states
that:
Forensic DNA typing has already proved its considerable worth,
and the future holds even greater promise with the advent of more
sensitive methods. As I have written elsewhere, DNA typing is
81.
82.
83.
84.

549 So. 2d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 695-96 (citations omitted).
955 F.2d 786 (2nd Cir. 1992).
Id. at 797.
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the ultimate identifier--so potentially powerful that it should
permit absolute individual identification and need never produce
a false positive, if done properly. DNA typing represents a
tremendous contribution of human genetics to society, of which
we should be proud.85
Though Lander wrote the above comments in the context of criticizing
the methodologies employed by the FBI, he nonetheless recognized the
"considerable worth" of forensic DNA typing. If one of the most respected
critics of a new and novel form of evidence concedes the value of such
evidence, then it would seem that the real issue is what weight should be
given the evidence, and not whether it should be admissible.

III. ANALYSIS: WHERE SCIENCE AND THE LAW MEET
Complicated and highly technical evidence puts the court in the
position of having to rely on others to make the distinction between science
and sham. No doubt the genesis of the Frye standard was the result of
courts feeling unable or unqualified to evaluate such evidence. By focusing
on whether the evidence is "generally accepted" in the relevant field, the
proponents of the Frye standard contend that it avoids having the court
choose a side in a scientific debate. But when a court has determined that
a novel procedure or methodology has not been generally accepted within
the scientific community, the court has sided with the party opposing the
introduction of such evidence. The inquiry concerning the issue of "general
acceptance" cannot be divorced from the substantive scientific debate. A
court cannot legitimately decide whether a theory or procedure is generally
accepted without first understanding the nature of the theory or procedure
in question and the criticisms of it which would prevent it from being
generally accepted within the scientific community.
This is clearly illustrated in the Barney decision where the court at
length discusses both the merits and criticisms of the DNA analysis
procedures utilized by the state, as well as the statistical interpretation of the
data and the scientific debate concerning it. 6
When the Barney court determined that the state's statistical interpretation of the DNA data was not generally accepted within the scientific
community, it was relying heavily on the opinions and criticisms of
Professor Lewontin and Dr. Hartl. Professor Lewontin and Dr. Hart] coauthored an influential article published in Science magazine which
85. Eric Lander, Letter to the Editor, 49 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 899, 899 (1991).
86. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737-43.
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criticized the FBI's methodology and expressed the view that the FBI's
statistical interpretation was unreliable. 87 The court's concern with the
merits of this debate is evident in its succinct rendition of the opinions of
Professor Lewontin and Dr. Hart], along with its citation of many scientific
articles supporting their position."8
While both Professor Lewontin and Dr. Hart] are respected figures in
the field of population genetics, there were scientists of equal stature who
disagreed with them. In the same issue Science published a rebuttal article
by Professors Ranajit Chakraborty and Kenneth Kidd that disputed the
conclusions of Professor Lewontin and Dr. Hart] and asserted that the
methods being used were reliable and should be allowed to be presented in
court.8 9 Thus, while the court was correct in recognizing the existence of
a current scientific dispute, it, in effect, sided with those who believed that
the evidence was not reliable enough to be presented in court.
To be sure the court explicitly denied taking a side in the debate, it
stated:
But the point is not whether there are more supporters than
detractors, or whether (as the Attorney General and amici curiae
claim) the supporters are right and the detractors are wrong. The
point is that there is disagreement between two groups, each
significant in both number and expertise . . .9
The Frye analysis, according to the Barney court, involves only
recognizing the existence of a dispute and not making any value judgments
about the dispute. By framing the issue of what constitutes general
acceptance in terms of whether or not a significant scientific debate exists,
the court undoubtedly felt its task was made much easier. Instead of
focusing on what the scientific debate was about, the court examined only
whether or not a substantial scientific debate exists.
But this kind of analysis is as troublesome as trying to weigh the merits
of a scientific debate, raising questions such as: How can a court determine
whether a scientific dispute is substantial as opposed to trivial? When is a
particular group of scientists significant in number and expertise? To what
extent can a scientific dispute over a theory or procedure exist without
affecting the general acceptance of that theory or procedure? In answering
the above questions, a court is right back to making value judgments best

87. Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hart, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA

Typing, 254 Scl. 1745 (1991).
88. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743.

89. Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic
Work, 254 SCi. 1735 (1991).

90. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743.
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made by those within the scientific community. One would expect disagreement within the scientific community over who has "significant
expertise" or how many scientists constitute a "significant number."
The conclusion by a court that a scientific debate exists entails a value
judgment as to the merits of the dispute. In effect, the court chose sides
with the critics of the new theory or procedure who contend that the
scientific community is divided over it. At the same time, the court
disregards the assertions from the proponents of the new theory or procedure
who claim that no substantive dispute exists within the scientific community.
The result is that when the court gives its justification for recognizing the
existence of a scientific dispute, it has adopted the position of the critics of
the new theory or procedure.
This is plainly illustrated within the debate concerning the admissibility
of DNA evidence. Professor Lewontin and Dr. Hartl's fundamental
criticism of the statistical analysis employed by the FBI is that it does not
adequately account for substructuring in the population. Thus, the broad
categories of Caucasian, Black, and Hispanic used by the FBI to generate
their final probability figures do not accurately reflect the genetic diversity
which occurs in subgroups throughout our population. The statistical
interpretation based upon such broad data bases are therefore unreliable.
Professors Chakraborty and Kidd, however, evaluated the same data as
Professor Lewontin and Dr. Hartl, but concluded that even if substructuring
occurs in the population, it would not affect the reliability of the probability
calculations performed by the FBI. Lewontin and Hartd have claimed that
general acceptance is lacking within the scientific community over the FBI's
methodology, 91 while other proponents of DNA evidence have asserted the
92
contrary.
Where does this leave a court attempting to determine whether a
scientific theory or procedure has been generally accepted within the
scientific community? The Barney court reduced the question to whether
there was significant division within the scientific community, and did so by
relying on sources of unquestionable stature. The court placed great weight
upon a series of articles published in Science magazine which chronicled the
academic debate and the National Research Council's 1992 report DNA
Technology in Forensic Science.
Several articles in the December 20, 1991, issue of Science magazine
concerned the use of DNA analysis in court. The issue contained the
91. Daniel L. Hartl & Richard C. Lewontin, Letter to the Editor, 260 Sci. 473, 473
(1993).
92. See Bernard Devlin et al., Statistical Evaluation of DNA Fingerprinting: A Critique
of the NRC's Report, 259 Sci. 748 (1993).
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aforementioned Lewontin-Hartl and Chakraborty-Kidd articles as well as one
93
entitled Fight Erupts Over DNA Fingerprinting.
In the latter article,
author Leslie Roberts, after setting forth the positions of the opposing sides
in the controversy, comments that the contemporaneously published
Lewontin-Harti and Chakraborty-Kidd articles will "reinforce the notion that
the community is indeed divided."94
The National Academy of Sciences, through its National Research
Council (NRC) hoped to settle the debate and give guidance to courts by
convening a committee on DNA technology in forensic science. The
committee consisted of preeminent people from both the scientific and legal
communities. The NRC published a report in 1992, specifically addressing
the issues surrounding the use of DNA evidence in court. 95 As to the NRC
report, the Barney court emphasized the committee's acknowledgement that
a "substantial controversy" exists concerning the present method of statistical
analysis. 96
At first look this appears to be an objective way of determining
whether a new scientific procedure is generally accepted within the scientific
community. Here the Barney court looked to a leading scientific publication
which acknowledged the existence of some division within the scientific
community. Also relied upon were the comments by the NRC admitting
the existence of such a division. When one looks closer at the Barney
decision, however, it becomes clear that the court was very selective in what
it relied upon, emphasizing only the portions of the cited scientific literature
which supported the exclusion of the evidence. What the court seemingly
ignored, however, was the recommendation by the Council that DNA
analysis be used in court to resolve criminal cases.97 Instead the court
quoted language from the report to support its finding of a lack of general
acceptance, apparently no small oversight.
The NRC undertook a study of the use of DNA analysis in forensic
science precisely because of the questions which had been raised about its
reliability in courts of law. In fact, the Science article Fight Erupts Over
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts Over DNA Fingerprinting, 254 Scd. 1721 (1991).
Id. at 1723.
See NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 131-51.
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 741.
NRC REPORT, supra note 2, stating as follows:
We recommend that the use of DNA analysis for forensic purposes,
including the resolution of both criminal and civil cases, be continued while
improvements and changes suggested in this report are being made. There
is no need for a general moratorium on the use of the results of DNA
typing either in investigation or in the courts.
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DNA Fingerprinting," which was so extensively cited by the Barney court,
ends with a quote from the chairman of the committee, Victor McKusick,
who expressed the hope that the committee would provide the definitive
word that the courts could turn to." While the Barney court acknowledged
the stature of the NRC when it commented that the recommendations will
likely be considered to be generally accepted in the scientific community,"m it nevertheless ignored the committee's recommendations on the
ultimate issue of whether the evidence is admissible in court. This
selectivity by the court reveals its bias.
The Barney court simply was not being totally objective, as it claimed,
in determining the issue of general acceptance. Evidently the critics of
DNA evidence swayed the court. Endeavoring to determine whether a
scientific division is significant necessarily involves looking at the debate
from within the scientific community. From that perspective evaluating
what and who are significant presupposes some mastery over the issues
being debated. It is simply not possible to determine what is a significant
debate without weighing the merits of the arguments on each side of the
debate.
Furthermore, the court's reduction of the Frye analysis to a determination of whether a division exists in the scientific community over a theory
or procedure is, by itself, an untenable standard to determine whether the
DNA evidence is admissible. The nature of science is to question and
debate not only each scientific advance, but also generally accepted
principles. Albert Einstein's theory of relativity became possible only
because he questioned the well-accepted Newtonian concepts of space and
time. I0 1 Thus, the fact that there is division in the scientific community
over a new theory or principle is to be expected.
The insufficiencies of focusing on whether there is a division in the
scientific community to make a determination of the admissibility of

98. Roberts, supra note 93.
99. Id. at 736.
100. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745.
101.

MAX BORN, EINSTEIN'S THEORY OF RELATIVITY, I (Rev. ed. 1965).
The special theory of relativity of 1905 can be justifiably considered the
end of a classical period or the beginning of a new era. For it uses the
well-established classical ideas of matter spread continuously in space and
time, and of causal or, more precisely, deterministic laws of nature. But
it introduces revolutionary notions of space and time, resolutely criticizing
the traditional concepts as formulated by Newton. Thus it opens a new
way of thinking about natural phenomena.
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evidence was elaborated by another California court. In People v. Soto 02
the court recognized that more had to be established to show a lack of
general acceptance within the scientific community other than the fact that
there was a division. 3 In upholding the admissibility of DNA evidence,
including its statistical interpretation, the court noted:
Soto submits the mere existence of "two sides" in the scientific
discussion means the whole subject must be excluded. We cannot
agree; if that were literally true, no scientific evidence could ever
be admitted. Inherent in the scientific method is "testing and
confirmation of [ ] hypotheses . . .", a never-ending process. As
Albert Einstein said, "One reason why mathematics enjoys special
esteem, above all other sciences, is that its laws are absolutely
certain and indisputable, while those of all other sciences are to
some extent debatable . . . ." If the Kelly requirements were met
only if there were no debate on a subject, even Copernicus's
theory of a sun-centered solar system could not be mentioned in
a court of law. The flat earth society would carry the day.
Indeed, no scientific advance has yet been developed that cannot
be questioned or debated.1 4
The court then found that there was general acceptance in the scientific
community concerning the probability calculations used by the state citing
new data of the FBI's "exhaustive, five-volume study of worldwide VNTR
data that rebuts the Hartl-Lewontin assumption that population subgroups
affect DNA probability estimates to a defendant's disadvantage."' 0 5
While the Soto court rightly points out the dilemma of trying to define
what constitutes general acceptance within the scientific community when
the nature of science requires continual examination and criticism of
accepted principles, it nonetheless resolved the issue in the same manner as
the Barney court did when it based its decision by choosing a side in the
debate. It clearly chose a side in the debate when it characterized the new
FBI report as "rebut[ting] the HartI-Lewontin assumption that population
subgroups affect DNA probability estimates to a defendant's disadvantage.""t
The Soto court cited no authority other than the FBI for that
conclusion. Professor Lewontin, Dr. Hart, and other critics of the FBI and
its report would not so eagerly accept the findings and conclusions of the
FBI report.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 856.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
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It is clear that the Frye analysis does not allow a court to avoid
becoming involved in weighing the merits of a scientific debate. Determining when there is general acceptance of new theory or procedure presupposes the ability to distinguish between substantive and trivial scientific
disputes. Unfortunately, as the DNA debate illustrates, new forensic
procedures are developed in an adversarial environment where the aforementioned distinction is hotly contested. When a court is faced with preeminent
experts who offer contradictory testimony as to whether DNA evidence is
generally accepted within the scientific community, a court can only resolve
the matter by educating itself about the dispute and determining whether the
criticisms of the new evidence have any merit.
But the Frye analysis is more than just ineffectual in terms of allowing
a court to remove itself from a scientific debate: it allows for the distortion
of what the scientific community believes to be reliable evidence. When a
few prominent scientists have legitimate criticisms concerning a forensic
process, their views are magnified when they are presented in an adversarial
manner before the court. The court hears defense expert witnesses state that
they truly represent the scientific community when they urge the court not
to admit the evidence, after it has just heard state expert witnesses assert the
contrary. Without attempting to reach a meeting of the minds between the
parties, it ends up being an all or nothing affair. 7 Because the dynamics
of such a hearing is that each side is given an equal opportunity to state its
case, it is far easier for a defense expert witness to persuade a judge that his
or her criticisms are generally held by scientists than it is to convince
scientists generally that those criticisms are valid.
This kind of distortion has occurred in the DNA debate, and was noted
in an editorial in Science magazine. Editor-in-Chief Daniel Koshland, after
recounting recent uses of DNA evidence to release the wrongfully convicted,
to identify a missing child, and to resolve a paternity suit, stated:
This acceptance of the validity of DNA evidence is exactly what
107. See Leslie Roberts, Science in Court: A Culture Clash, 257 SCi. 732 (1992).
Roberts states:
While the scientists are there to debate the best methodologies, the proper
interpretation of data, and the fine points of quality control, the lawyers are
out to win--and they use any tool at their disposal. Scientists find
unfavorable peer-review comments subpoenaed. Scientific mistakes and
inconsistent statements from different papers are dredged up and used
against them. There is no room for subtlety or nuance and certainly not
human error or scientific misjudgment. Instead, the normal processes of
scientific debate, of error and correction, are used to pillory witnesses on
the stand.
Id. at 732.
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most scientists in this area have believed appropriate, and a rebuke
to the judicial process that has been so slow to accept DNA
evidence by failing to see that a couple of outspoken individuals
were less representative of the scientific community than the vast
majority of careful scholars. (It is notable that the scientists
prominent in casting doubt on DNA use for the prosecution seem
to be nowhere in evidence to cast doubt on its use for de10 8
fense.).
Koshland later observed that "[tihe courts need better procedures to validate
new technologies rather than allowing an individual judge to establish a
precedent or a few scientists to represent a division in the community when
the vast majority are not divided."' 9
The Frye inquiry has had the result of promoting division within the
scientific community. Many of the scientists who became involved in the
early Frye hearings were subjected to ruthless cross examination where their
"motives [were] questioned and their integrity impugned."" This served
only to engender ill will within the scientific community."' Science
magazine, in recounting the unpleasant experiences of Dr. Hartl and Thomas
Caskey in the Yee case, noted, "[tlo the lawyers also goes the lion share of
the blame for keeping alive a scientific dispute that could undoubtedly have
been resolved by now in a nonadversarial setting.""'
The search for general acceptance of scientific principles in the
adversarial context is seemingly a lost cause. Eric Lander, the undisputed
guiding force behind the NRC report, acknowledged that the committee was
trying to approve a forensic process which would satisfy the legal standard
of being generally accepted." 3 The committee's goal was to obtain a
result which would be conservative enough to satisfy the critics, yet at the
same time allow a statistical interpretation impressive enough to obtain
convictions. But once the committee took this point of view, they were
engaged more in politics than science. Not surprisingly, this kind of
compromise was attacked by both the proponents and critics of DNA
evidence. The adversarial environment of the legal system makes such
108. Daniel E. Koshland Jr., The DNA Fingerprint Story (Continued), 265 Sci. 1015

(1994).
109. Id.
110. Roberts, supra note 93, at 732.
111. Id. at 734. In recounting the testimony of Hart], Roberts writes, "The defense
lawyers had shown Hart some scathing comments by the FBI's Bruce Budowle, about
Drosophila geneticists who wade into courtroom disputes." Id.
112. Id. at 736.
113. See Peter Aldhous, Geneticists Attack NRC Report as Scientifically Flawed, 259

Sci. 755, 756 (1993).
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compromises exceedingly difficult.
The NRC report was a self-conscious effort by the scientific community
to render a definitive statement as to what procedures involved in forensic
DNA analysis are generally accepted. As to the controversy surrounding the
statistical interpretation of the data, the committee proposed a "ceiling
principle," whereby the probability estimate of the rareness of a match in
4
genetic profiles is intentionally underestimated."
Not surprisingly, courts around the country seized upon the ceiling
principle as the definitive statement of what is to be considered to be the
5
generally accepted way of statistically interpreting DNA evidence." The
ceiling principle, however, was not generally accepted in the scientific
vigorously attacked by both proponents and critics of
community and was
6
DNA evidence.'
This absurd result is the product of the imposition of the Frye standard
to an emerging forensic science. Something as revolutionary as DNA
analysis--like any other scientific breakthrough--will be closely scrutinized
and subjected to much criticism. Because the new science will be presented
in the legal arena which is adversarial in nature, those criticisms will be
magnified. Frye hearings will, simply promote division.
After the confusion generated by the NRC report, Eric Lander and
Bruce Budowle, leading architects in the development of the forensic
processes involved in DNA analysis, authored an article declaring the DNA
wars over." 7 In that article they acknowledged the scientific deficiencies
of the ceiling principle, stating that it was "simply a practical way to
sidestep a contentious and unproductive debate."'"18 What is also quite
surprising and illustrative of the misunderstandings between the scientific
and legal communities whidh have permeated this debate was the statement
that the ceiling principle was never intended to bar experts from providing
their best estimates based on the product rule, and furthermore, that they
that should prevent the full use of
could "identify no remaining problem
9
DNA evidence in any court.''
114. NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 13-14.
115. E.g., State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 517 (Wash. 1993) (stating that "[a]lthough
we lack the scientific expertise to either assess or explain the methodology, its adoption by
the Committee indicates that sufficient acceptance within the scientific community has been
achieved to satisfy Frye in appropriate circumstances"); see also State v. Vandebogart, 652
A.2d 671, 678 (N.H. 1994).
116. Aldhous, supra note 113, at 756.
117. See Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest,
371 NATURE 735 (1994).
118. Id. at 737.
119. Id. at 735.
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The fact that the Lander-Budowle article had to be written evidences
the difficulty in obtaining a definitive statement of what constitutes general
acceptance. Those critical of the NRC's report will no doubt be critical of
the Lander-Budowle position. Lander-Budowle are correct when they
observe that if the NRC issues another report on the subject endorsing a different standard from the first report, then "some attorneys are sure to argue,
rightly or wrongly, that differences between the reports demonstrate a lack
of scientific consensus."'"2 What is important is not whether a definitive
statement can be made as to whether a forensic procedure is generally
accepted, but rather, as Lander and Budowle point out, that there is no
scientific reason to doubt the accuracy of forensic DNA typing results done
in accordance with currently accepted standards. Their focus is on the
scientific reliability of the process, not in proving the process to be generally
accepted.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, after excluding DNA results
because they did not meet the Frye criteria, eventually allowed evidence of
DNA results based upon the ceiling principle because it was demonstrated
to be reliable and not because it had been generally accepted within the
scientific community. 2' The court also recognized the problem of
applying the Frye standard to a new forensic science: "[plerhaps the
relevant scientific community has not yet digested and approved the
foundation of the theory or process, but the theory or process is so logically
reliable that evidence should be admitted even without its general acceptance
by involved scientists."' 22
This surely is the proper focus. If the reliability of the theory or
process has been established, the evidence should at least be presented to the
fact finder.
CONCLUSION

The DNA debate illustrates how contentious the presentation of new
forensic evidence will be. The debate also demonstrates how ill-suited the
Frye standard is in resolving such debates. As we have seen, those seeking
to exclude DNA evidence, primarily defendants and defense attorneys, have
asserted an entitlement to a second Frye hearing concerning how the
forensic scientist statistically interprets the raw data. Some courts have
agreed, even though the scientific dispute concerning such interpretations is

120. Id. at 738.
121. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d at 1348-49.
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empirical in nature and not theoretical. Such procedural fragmentation in
determining the admissibility of this type of evidence only validates the
arguments of those seeking to exclude it. The more fragmented the process
is, the more opportunity for issues the defense can raise, thus increasing the
odds of prevailing on only one issue, and having the evidence excluded as
a consequence.
This manipulation of the Frye analysis is possible primarily because of
the fear some courts have that a jury will be overwhelmed by technical
evidence and will be unable to give due consideration to legitimate
criticisms of such evidence. The less confidence a court has in the ability
of a jury to function as a finder of fact, the more likely it will intercede in
regulating what the jury hears. The Frye analysis makes it easier for a court
to intercede because the concept of general acceptance is so ambiguous.
Additionally, the Frye standard does not absolve a court from weighing
the merits of the new evidence. Conceptually much of the attractiveness of
the Frye standard comes from the belief that a court could effectively allow
someone else make the decision as to what evidence should be admissible
by awaiting a pronouncement from the amorphous scientific community.
But the adversarial context in which evidence is presented makes the
obtaining of an undisputed statement of its general acceptance next to
impossible. Because the stakes are high in a criminal case, there is
correspondingly an enormous incentive to discredit an emerging forensic
science. This promotes division over the forensic science itself, as well as
over whether it can be considered to be generally accepted, putting a court
right in the middle of a scientific dispute.
When one looks at the DNA debate and realizes how much forensic
science is founded on good science and is approved of by reputable scientists, the inescapable conclusion is that the Frye standard has done a
disservice to our court system. Its susceptibility to manipulation along with
its failure to deliver a court from making hard decisions about new evidence
results in its value being only to those who seek to exclude evidence. If
even the most respected critics of the science acknowledge its value, the fact
that the Frye standard is still being used to exclude DNA evidence would
seem to bolster Daniel Koshland's observation that "[slome judges are continuing to make silly rules indicating that they still do not understand the
science."' 23

123. Koshland, supra note 108, at 1015.

